Abstract: This paper argues that new rounds of socioeconomic reforms in post-1949 China, each with their distinct geographical expressions, constitute a complex palimpsest rather than a straightforward process of historical succession. Drawing on a review of extensive empirical evidence, the paper complicates two dichotomous portrayals of socioeconomic 'transition' in China, namely centralization and egalitarianism (the Mao era) and decentralization and uneven development (the postMao era). It demonstrates these binaries cannot adequately explain the post-Mao economic 'miracle' when decentralized governance and uneven development also characterized the Mao era. The paper concludes that decentralized governance and uneven development are not antithetical to the quest for perpetual CPC rule; just as the Mao administration strategically blended centralizing mechanisms with instituted uneven development to consolidate its power, the post-Mao regimes are repurposing Mao-era regulatory techniques to achieve the same objective.
Blending existing social-scientific empirical research with Chinese historical sources, published comments from leading scholars within China and first-hand information from senior planners, the paper develops a critical review that illustrates and complicates two binaries, namely 1) the characterization of a 'centralized' Mao era and decentralized governance as the driver of post-Mao 'reform and liberalization'; and 2) the portrayal of "social and spatial inequalities", to re-borrow Heilmann and Perry's (2011: 10) terms, as outcomes of post-Mao governance vis-à-vis more egalitarian developmental strategies under the Mao administration. Political centralization in the late 1950s -primarily instituted through the 'scaling up' of household-based landownership to the communes and the state, the rural collectivization of economic production and the strict control of demographic mobility -was actually premised on decentralization and instituted uneven development. In addition, urban-rural inequality peaked during the [1958] [1959] [1960] Great Leap Forward in the history of 'new China', while inter-provincial disparities were pronounced throughout the Mao era. These reviews collectively suggest new rounds of socioeconomic reforms in post-1949 'new China', each with their distinct geographical expressions, constitute a complex palimpsest rather than a straightforward process of historical succession.
The discussion is organized in three parts. Section 2 will problematize the view of politico-economic development in China as outcomes of centralization or decentralization.
Section 3 presents an evaluation of empirical data on uneven development during and after the Mao era. These sections seek jointly to illustrate how static conceptions of space and time preclude a more fluid theorization of Chinese economic growth since 1978, specifically how inherited institutions interact with reformist initiatives to enhance developmental goals, primarily state-driven capital accumulation. The paper then concludes by considering how decentralized governance and uneven development are not antitheses of CPC rule; just as ! 6! 2010). The common approach in these works is the attribution of the post-1978 economic growth 'miracle' to the decentralization of regulatory capacities to city-regions. In other words, there is a positive causal relationship between decentralized governance and rapid economic growth.
These empirical accounts have illuminated our understanding of the fast-changing
Chinese political economy in two major ways. First, they demonstrate cogently how the Chinese central government does not -or, indeed, cannot -function as an omnipotent and omnipresent allocative-cum-redistributive institution. This is because of the inherent difficulty for central planning agencies to gain timely access to information on demand and supply across what has always been a geographically-expansive and socially heterogeneous economy. Indeed, centralized control during the Mao-era existed only under strict control of personal freedoms (Greenhalgh and Winkler, 2005; Dikötter, 2011; Yang, 2012) . And even so, commodity supply never prioritized swift responses to (domestic) consumer demand.
Second, the proactive approach to reconfigure Chinese state space in relation to the demands of economic liberalization underscores the territory-based politics intrinsic in central governance (cf. Howell, 2006; Wei, 2007; Peck and Zhang, 2013) . This is exemplified through the Deng administration's strategy to cater to the interests of provincial officials -or 'playing to the provinces' -in order to develop potent counterweights against senior conservatives in Beijing (Shirk, 1993) 3 . Underpinning this approach was a centralizing logic: the reformers could retain the structure of the Maoist state and facilitate a smoother transition to market-like rule through sharing greater power and benefits (fangquan rangli).
Studies have shown how increased autonomy in provincial decision-making unleashed GDP growth through stretching centrally-defined parameters. Segal and Thun institutional structure of the CPC encourages "strategic disobedience" at local levels. This dynamic response by local governments triggered observations of the rise of -or a return to -'mountain-stronghold mentalities' (shantou zhuyi) or 'economic feudalism' (jingji zhuhou). Oi (1992: 126) , for instance, predicts "the success of local state corporatism may in the long run force the emergence of something akin to a federal system that more clearly recognizes the rights and power of localities" (see also Oi, 1998) . While a federal system did not emerge, localities went on to expand their "rights and power" to drive growth projects. An 'excited phenomenon' amongst local governments, which shouldn't have occurred, became apparent: orders were disobeyed and prohibitions defied (lingbuxing, jinbuzhi), there was no adherence to the adjustment discipline, acceptance of orders were only superficial (yangfengyinwei)…People were even joking that, during the course of regional development in China, a weird phenomenon has occurred: the more a local government covertly disagrees with the central government's macro adjustment policies and behaves more opportunistically, the more the local economy benefits; vice versa. (Interview with China Economic Weekly, 2006; author's translation).
Han's observation corresponds with empirical research that portrays growing tensions within central-local dynamics. Local transgressions against macro-level policies are evident in at least three domains where the central government tried to exert more control, namely to reduce 1) investments in pollutive industries (Economy, 2011; Lan et al, 2012) ; 2) clandestine financial transactions through the 'shadow banking system' (Tsai, 2004; Li and Hsu, 2012; Breslin, 2014) ; and 3) speculative investments in real estate Yang, 1996, Guo and Huang, 2010) . Emergent debates over the superiority of regional developmental approaches further suggests bottom-up constraints on national economic integration have (re)surfaced (Qiu, 2011; Qu, 2012; Zhang and Peck, 2014; ref. discussion A series of historically-engaged reflections paint a more fine-shaded picture of decentralization, however. As Li and Wu (2012: 92) put it, "decentralization is a state strategy", and Wu Jinglian, a senior economic consultant to the CPC, offers a vivid recollection of how this "state strategy" was, in a contradictory twist, already entrenched in the two decades prior to the 1978 reforms:
Following the decentralization of administrative power in 1958 and 1970, chaotic scenes emerged in the economy. Where did the problem come from? Those decentralizing initiatives were implemented within the framework of a 'commandeering economy'. While the microeconomic decisions in enterprises remained totally subject to hierarchical control, dayto-day regulatory power was decentralized. Apart from defense industries and some industries of an experimental nature, all enterprises experienced decentralization to very low levels. From production planning, fixed capital investment, redistribution of goods and capital, financial and fiscal management, credit provision, all processes were decentralized. The outcome was a plethora of 'centers', every local government sought not to fall behind by comparing and amending planning targets,[as such] the targets kept increasing, all sorts of 'satellites' [the nickname of the time for ambitious targets, termed after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite that Mao strongly admired] were released this way. (Wu, in Wu and Ma, 2012: 49; author's translation) Within this "commandeering economy" (mingling jingji), orders were issued randomly without much prior expert knowledge or relation to the national 'plan'. Such randomnesstermed 'wanton guidance' or xia zhihui -was particularly pronounced during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and contrasted the scientific rationality that enabled the Soviet Union to determine the production and exchange of a vast range of commodities (Qin, 2004: 77-78 During its first decade of power, the Mao government wanted to construct a socialist economy modeled after a Stalin-styled Soviet Union (Li, 2006; Bernstein and Li, 2010 Comrade Liu Bocheng often uses a Sichuan phrase "Yellow cat, black cat, whichever catches the mice is a good cat". This refers to fighting battles, that we were able to defeat Chiang Kai-shek was because we did not play by old rules, we did not follow old ways of fighting, everything depended on circumstance, what counted was victory. To recover rural production currently also depends on circumstance, that is, the relations of production cannot adopt a fixed and unchanging form, whichever form stimulates the enthusiasm of the masses shall be adopted. (Deng, 7 July 1962; see Deng, 1994: 323; author's translation).
Mao would have none of any "old rules", however. For this and other 'right leaning' ! 11! 1998: 44; author's translation). Practically, it was more manageable for the National Planning Commission, the-then central planning agency in charge of the highly complex agricultural production system, to transmit information to 26,000 communes than if it was done at the next administrative level, the production brigades (shengchan dadui), which numbered around 800,000 units (Jones and Poleman, 1962; Perkins and Yusuf, 1984) .
Taken together, these two points underscore how the reterritorialization of 'new China' became a precondition and an outcome of an economically nationalistic approach to capital accumulation.
A new round of decentralized governance was launched during the Cultural Revolution to ensure the 'capitalist roaders' would not undermine Maoist economic nationalism. As Donnithorne's (1972) Bearing these issues in mind, this paper is careful not to reify decentralized governance as an autonomous driver of post-Mao socioeconomic reforms. As Cai and Treisman (2006: 506) put it, the key reforms that "reshaped China's economy began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, before any significant decentralization had occurred. In fact, China's authoritarian centralization helped speed the geographical spread of policies found to work well". Along the same vein, Ma (2005: 478; cf. Shen, 2007) observes the "rescaling of China's nation-building efforts downward in the post-1978 reform era represents not so much the retreat and disarticulation of the central state as a rearticulation of state power with a different form of state intervention at lower spatial scales". These findings correspond with Li's (1997: 49) proposal that the central-provincial relationship in China must be conceptualized as a "non-zero-sum, interactive process of conflicts and compromises, whereby genuine changes to the relationship are made." Building on these studies, this paper argues that a more fruitful research avenue is to examine whether the territorial reconfiguration of regulatory policies have altered the fundamental roles and objectives of the CPC.
Uneven economic-geographical development: undesirable outcome or developmental precondition?
The evolution of 'new China' was and remains characterized by uneven economicgeographical development. Empirical studies consistently reveal entrenched income inequality between the urban and the rural meso-scales and between provinces (cf. earlier reviews by Fan, 1995 and Wei, 2007) . Donnithorne (1972: 618) notes how "efficient cells do not subsidize the inefficient" following Mao's down-scaling of "self reliance" to individual economic units during the Cultural Revolution, a development that "of course militates against egalitarianism" (cf. Snead, 1975) . Inter-provincial income disparities did not narrow between 1952 and 1985, as Tsui (1991) discovers. This corresponded with Lyons' (1991) analysis of output data between 1952 and 1987. Instead of reducing income inequality, Lyons (1991: 499) found "the absolute gaps between richest and poorest widened considerably between the 1950s and the mid-1980s". For this reason, Lyons (1991: 499) concludes that the Mao era "cannot be viewed as a wholly successful implementation of the egalitarian ideals widely thought to underlie the Chinese model of development".
A separate study on real per capita consumption between 1952 and 2000 by Kanbur and Zhang (2005) reinforces the validity of these studies. They identified sharp growth in interprovincial inequality 1) in the buildup to the Great Leap Forward (1955 Forward ( -1960 ; 2) after the Cultural Revolution began in 1966; and 3) after the Deng administration made a distinct turn to urban-oriented industrialization in the early 1990s. The key finding of this study was the return of urban-rural inequality in 2000 -albeit at higher levels of income -to that of ! 15! levels, one before reforms and one two decades after, is empirically significant because it indicates the exacerbation of inequality was not solely an outcome of marketization. By implication, this calls for a qualitative exploration of factors that contributed to uneven development in post-Mao China.
Figure 1 here
Research indicates enduring uneven development is entwined with the 'scaling up' of the national fiscal system during the 1990s. As mentioned in section 2, power centralization during the Mao era was actualized through decentralized governance, and this strategy severely undermined the financial power of the central government. Tsui (1991) suggests that the connection originated from the launch of the Great Leap Forward industrialization campaign in 1958. The decentralized fiscal governance that accompanied this campaign witnessed the doubling of the share of extra-budgetary revenue, defined as fiscal funds not subject to control or extraction by the central government, in the 1960s. This trend went on to exhibit "a distinct upward trend in the 1970s and 1980s" (Tsui, 1991: 15) .
This ability to raise funds independent of the central government directly contributed to unevenness in economic output and standards of living during the Mao era. Wen Tiejun, the long-time economic consultant to the CPC, corroborated this point in a recent interview with
Nanfang Ribao:
What is known as localized development began in 1957, when the Soviet Union stopped giving China aid-related investments. The central government's budget fell, this budget became a 'red line' while local budgets were the 'blue lines'. Because there was no more money [in Beijing], there was no true centralization of power in China since the 1950s. At the time, all the older comrades knew of this phrase "central finance is sitting on the slides, local finances are soaring through the skies" [zhongyang caizheng zuo huati, difang caizheng zuo feiji]. In the later part of the 1950s, together with the Great Leap Forward, the entire developmental process was driven by local economies; the central government in fact did not possess the capacity to command the localities. Hence we say, for a long time since the 1950s, the local economy took precedence, it was only until the 1994 fiscal reforms that resource redistribution became half-half. or zhuanxiang caizheng zhuanyi, a redistributive mechanism that is "typically not rule-based and thus subject to political influence" (Huang and Chen, 2013: 534; ref. also Sheng, 2010 ).
More noteworthy is the fact that these special purpose transfers constitute the largest components of fiscal redistribution from the central government to individual provinces 9 . The resultant "anti-equalizing" effects of centralized fiscal redistribution, which saw fiscal funds directed to more developed provinces, effectively generates fresh rounds of uneven economic-geographical development. Wen Tiejun puts the positive correlation between fiscal centralization and the central government's political power in contemporary perspective:
Right now the central government's primary mechanism to control the local economies is fiscal transfer payments, through special purpose transfers. Naturally special purpose transfers became the central aspect of the state's financial institution, it is a major institutional gamble. The persistence of centrally-influenced "regional disparities" strongly suggests the 'cellular economy' was repurposed rather than thoroughly reconfigured after 1978 (cf. Donnithorne, 1972; World Bank, 1995) . To be sure, marketizing reforms introduced new processes in the Lee, 1998; Young, 2000) . The effects of local protectionism could directly be seen in productivity disparities between export-oriented firms and firms that receive local market protection. As Yang and He (2014: 369) demonstrate, "productive firms enjoying local protection are less likely to export" since they benefit local monopoly advantages; conversely, less productive exporting firms tend to agglomerate to enjoy "exporting spillover effects" that allow them to directly enter international markets. In a separate study on the relationship between local protectionism and firm failure, He and Yang (2015) found firms enjoying direct subsidies and loans from formal institutions are less likely to fail. The critical determinant between survival and shutdown is access to rather than the quantity of support: "[w]hether firms get subsidies and banking loans actually is more important than how much they get since both subsidies and loans represent governmental support" (He and Yang, 2015: 9) . These important findings underscore the constitutive effects of inherited subnational barriers to trade on the national economic-geographical configuration. Against these empirical contributions, it can be inferred that the 'cellular' economic-geographical structure and its accompanying protectionist tendencies that characterized Maoist China were reconfigured in relation to post-Mao regulatory and fiscal centralization. Rongji government, this approach based local officials' promotional prospects on GDP growth. Unsurprisingly, these officials relied on administrative borders to create barriers to market entry and in turn 'guarantee growth' (bao zengzhang) (for more on the transfers of administrative personnel around provinces under a nomenklatura personnel system, see Naughton and Yang, 2004; Chien and Gordon, 2008; Xu, 2011) 10 .
Apart from the inherited fiscal system, one other Mao-era institution -the urban-rural Finance and assets began to be concentrated by select private owners with the expanded privatization of rural industries, in particular to insiders previously working in the rural industries (Hinton, 1990; Rozelle et al, 2000; Li and Rozelle, 2004) . This corresponding search for 'economic efficiency' through 'crowding out' produced rural class polarization and increasing inequality, with a growing number of rural workers either laid off or forced to accept wages significantly lower than those offered in the coastal city-regions (cf. So, 2003;  ! 20! Liu, 2006; Hung, 2008; Webber, 2012) . Higher wages in the cities took on new significance with the roll-back of rural social services and the decline in rural employment in the same period. As a senior planner in Beijing puts it, the contraction of these capacities was correlated to the dismantling of the People's Communes in and after 1984:
To take as an example, under the commune institution, if an instruction came in from above to build roads, then the commune cadres must think of ways to get the funds through economic production before using the funds to build the roads. Under the current institution, similarly instructions will come from above to build roads or provide other facilities, but the village governments have no money. Because they are not in charge of economic production, they will go around assessing people in the villages for funds, this easily creates situations where funds are extracted illegally, without regard for the necessity and ability of the villagers to pay. Nowadays they even have to borrow from banks or non-authorized agencies, but these [loans] must be paid back. From whom do they get the money? The peasants. (2006) terms 'selective withdrawal', the 'growing out' process was characterized by a 'dual track' approach to production initiated by the former Premier, Zhao Ziyang, in 1984. This approach replaced the Soviet-styled 'planned system' with the defining feature of post-Mao socioeconomic reforms -marketization. While some parts of industrial production remained planned by the central state and anchored the national economy, certain aspects of previously-monopolized industrial sectors were opened up to private buyers and sellers.
Surplus goods could be sold at privately-determined prices and producers in these sectors were able to compete directly with the growing non-state economy. The overarching ! 21! objective, to Naughton (1995: 200) , was to "expand market forces by limiting the scope of planning, fostering entry, and improving incentives and autonomy for state-run enterprises to operate on the market". 'Dual track' production culminated in an official acknowledgement in 1993 that all means of production should be geared towards a the development of a 'socialist market economy'. This economically-nationalistic project is now officially termed as "the China Dream".
The gradualism of 'growing out' distinguished the Chinese transition to market-like from the 'big bang' policies of the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe in one major way:
there was no corresponding political instability at the national scale. However, one crucial precondition requires emphasis: the 'planned system' Naughton (1995) referred to was effectively an urban-based system. It was a system institutionally, structurally and socially separate from the rural hinterland. This distinction means two-track pricing would be hard to implement in the former Soviet bloc because the state industrial sector in this bloc played a dominant role and the majority of the population was employed by state(-linked) institutions.
In contrast, only 18% of China's population were based in urban-based industrial danweis in 1978. Contrasting the pressures for total socioeconomic restructuring in the former Soviet bloc, the CPC did not have to induce unemployment in order to facilitate market-based reforms. Zhao's 'dual track' approach was therefore capable of driving non-state economic growth because of Mao's apartheid-like policy to segregate the rural population (and its associated economic activities) from the urban. With state monopoly relaxed in the industrial sectors, the platform was established for the rural-based economic actors to engage in direct competition with urban-based SOEs. Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) gained market entry and stimulated competition (Naughton, 1994) . At the same time, the approach also facilitated the launch of the biggest non-state market of all -the market for surplus rural labor power.
! 22!
If there was a primary corollary of post-Mao marketization, it was the seamless production of a 'floating' labor market that powered the exponential GDP growth in China since the early 2000s (cf. Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Lim, 2014b) . Within this market, peasant migrant workers could be priced solely as a-social labor power. Since the early 1990s, this has taken place in segmented intra-urban labor markets comprising what Fan (2002: 103) terms "the elite, the natives and the outsiders". Without corresponding sociospatial protection, these "outsiders" became less rooted to their new urban destinations; yet without corresponding growth in employment opportunities in their rural 'hometowns', they could only continue to 'float' between city-regions to seek employment (Solinger, 1999; Chan, 2010a Chan, , 2010b . Peng Xizhe, a leading public policy scholar from Shanghai's Fudan University, puts the situation in perspective:
The reason why rural workers can engage in economic activities at much lower wages in the cities is due to this two-tiered social status. If there is no hukou institution in China, rural workers will hope to have the same lifestyles, the same wages, and the same working conditions as those living in cities. Yet because one continues to feel s/he is a peasant [in the cities], that the 'home' is in the countryside, the feeling of being in the city would be for the purpose of earning some income. So long as wages are acceptable [in relation to those in the countryside], s/he will be willing to work. This phenomenon is an important precondition of the existence of low-cost labor in China. (Xinhua, 13 August 2009: n.p.; author's translation) Two distinct functions constitute this important precondition. First, it eases the financial burden on municipal governments to provide social welfare. This consequently allows these governments to concentrate on attracting and developing factors of production necessary to embed capital. Second, it ensures the labor supply is geographically elastic to shifts in effective demand for labor power (which to a large extent is derived demand, due to the export-orientation of many labor-intensive industries along the coastal seaboard after the in the global division of labor, there will be a large underclass that has low pay and very uncertain employment conditions. Because of the existing structure, this underclass could still move freely between the urban and rural areas" (Interview with Nanfeng Chuang, 14 January 2014; author's translation; cf. He, 2010) .
The socioeconomic logic of retaining rural 'territorial absorbers' is highlighted by the Guangdong provincial government's swift response to the 2008 global financial crisis. A "double relocation" industrial policy (shuang zhuanyi), also known as 'emptying the cage to change the birds' (tenglong huanniao), was instituted to relocate unwanted industries and the labor power they employ (the 'birds') away from the Pearl River Delta (the 'cage'). While it was expected that this restructuring would result in a temporary dip in economic performance, the official employment figures in Guangdong province were positive even after the crisis struck in 2008. Nationally, the published unemployment rate was under 10%.
This rosy picture was complicated after Wen Jiabao, the-then Premier, acknowledged in a meeting with foreign delegates in 2010 that 200 million people were unemployed (China Daily, 23 March 2010). Relative to the total population (~1.38 billion), this translates to a 14.5% unemployment rate; the rate becomes 20% when measured against the total working population (~1 billion).
In relation to official accounts from Guangdong, Wen's speech strongly suggests unemployment that should be concentrated within Guangdong, the most attractive Once you grasp the logic of saving the Party, it is possible to get a basic understanding of Deng Xiaoping's logic. Everything he did was done to save the Party. Saving the Party required boosting productivity. So to catch the "mouse" of saving the Party, we needed the "cat" of the market economy. It was for this reason that Deng Xiaoping supported economic reforms with all his might. He deserves to be credited as a supporter of economic reforms, even though he didn't care much for economics and didn't understand the market; and he was their most powerful supporter. However, his goal was still to save the Party, and for that reason he was a fierce protector of Party power and status. Just 18 months after the inception of economic reforms, he was quick to stamp out any small green shoots of "liberalism" in a thorough attack, lest they take root and flourish in a change in climate and strike at the heart of the Party.
Identifying transformative change in the context of this logic requires a robust re-evaluation of uneven development in post-1949 China. To begin, it would be helpful to move beyond measuring whether inter-regional inequality is inherently negative or unethical vis-à-vis the CPC's self-proclaimed quest for socialism. As this section has shown, institutional change within the sprawling party-state apparatus is not constituted by a one-track movement from spatial egalitarianism in the Mao era towards greater fragmentation in the 'transitional' present. Rather, as presented in Table 1 
Conclusion
Is China an exceptional case because its Leninist system has been able to sustain change along the lines of a mixed economy? Or is Chinese exceptionalism something of an illusion which obscures an underlying conformity with the fundamental logic of a Soviet-style system -the fusion of politics and economics? It is quite possible to give affirmative answers to both questions. -Steven M. Goldstein (1995 Goldstein ( : 1110 In carrying out the construction of socialism by our party, leaders, and people, there are two periods, [one that is] before reform and liberalization and [one] after that…Although there were major differences in the ideological direction, orientation, and policies in the implementation of socialist construction during these two historical periods, they cannot be disconnected. Furthermore, they are not oppositional. One cannot use the historical period following reform and liberalization to negate the historical period prior to reform and liberalization, and vice versa. Questioning the notion that socioeconomic reforms in the post-Mao era represent a linear-sequential devolution that transformed the Chinese political economy (see, e.g., such assumptions in Pei, 2006; Huang, 2008; Coase and Wang, 2012) , this paper developed critical reviews that demonstrate how centralized political power was never compromised ! 27! by new waves of decentralization and uneven development. Contrasting the drastic changes in the former Soviet bloc, Deng and his successors repurposed central political institutions through decentralized governance, territorially-targeted policy experimentation and the reproduction of regulatory uneven development. Rather than constitute a one-track historical movement from centralized state-socialism to a decentralized market regime, changes that took place produced a quasi-exceptional process in which Leninist socialism co-exists with marketization to produce new spatial logics of socioeconomic regulation (cf. Howell, 2006; Wei, 2007; Li and Wu, 2012; Lim, 2014a) . There is no eclipse of one national "system" (or paradigm) by another.
Indeed, new reform initiatives and institutional continuities are co-constitutive. As the current Chinese President, Xi Jinping, acknowledges, the political economic history of 'new China' cannot be characterized by two distinct and oppositional 30-year periods.
While there were distinct differences in the ways the economic production and were the methods -or, more specifically, the spatial strategies -to achieve these objectives. Mao chose the 'cellular' organization of the People's Communes and geoeconomic insulation, even to the extent of shutting out Soviet influence during the 1960s;
Deng and his successors sought to engage and ultimately integrate with the global system of capitalism through policy experimentation in targeted territories.
While these approaches generated contradictions and led to new reforms, many inherited institutions were never fully abandoned (ref. and, last but not least, the readiness to intervene in market functions "without hesitation", as exemplified by its decisive attempt to dictate stock market trading in the summer of 2015 (Rawski, 1995; Naughton, 1995; Ong, 2004; Zhu, 2007; Heilmann, 2009; Walter and Howie, 2011; People's Daily, 20 July 2015 ; see far right column in Table 1 ). It is apparent from these developments that the enlargement of capital, which encompasses both the state and non-state sectors, has been entwined with its subsumption to party goals in the post-Mao era. As Zhang (2013 Zhang ( : 1614 puts it, "the political power of capital in China remains fundamentally embedded in, and interlaced with, the sprawling institutional machinery of the Leninist party-state and the political capacities of the CCP".
It would be more apt, then, to conceptualize politico-economic evolution in post-1949 'new China' as a cumulative process through which place-specific reforms are layered on inherited logics of socioeconomic regulation. Emerging from this regular re-layering is a multi-dimensional state spatiality that is connected to the global economy in highly uneven ways. In turn, it determines whether the CPC can continue to govern the Chinese political ! 29! economy as a unitary and hierarchical political system. The old 'planned system' may have given way to market-like governance, but the logics of the market have become the baseline from which new planning capacities are developed by the party-state apparatus.
While 'withdrawal' has taken place in 'select' domains, as Pei (2006) rightly points out, there is reinforcement of state power in others (cf. Zhang, 2013; Zhu, 2013; Wu, 2015) . The rollback of political capacities may be apparent when it is viewed in relation to the inherited and seemingly static institutional template (e.g. HRS vs. Maoist collective production), but it is never a zero-sum process. This points to the need for a new framework that is sensitive 1 That these three commodities, deemed 'fictitious' by Karl Marx, were placed under public ownership is in itself symbolic. 2 The reference to 'socialism' in this paper does not reflect nor impose a normative conceptualization. Following Whyte (2010) , emphasis is placed on the CPC's self-proclaimed quest for socialism as an empirical fact rather than what 'socialism' means when it is measured against a particular template (e.g. Marx's version based on the experience of western capitalist economies or Lenin's version based on the largely agrarian Russian economy). While the CPC claims both Marx's and Lenin's versions to be relevant to its quest (at least ideologically), its official commitment to creating 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' is path-setting given the collapse of the socialist internationalist movement. What 'socialism' means for the CPC is thereby an empirical question, to be explored in tandem with marketization reforms and the emergence of new planning capacities in the party-state apparatus. 3 This was possible because the Mao administration had deliberately emphasized a decentralized mode of governance (see discussion shortly). 4 With the implementation of the 12 th Five Year Plan in 2012, the Chinese central government has regularly committed to reduce its GDP growth target to a 'new normal' of around 8%. This figure was revised to 7% in 2015 as the CPC, in Premier Li Keqiang's terms, sought to fight "systemic, institutional and structural problems" (The Guardian, 8 March 2015) . A major policy to address this problem was launched in September 2014 and was targeted directly at reducing the powers of prefecture-and county-level cities (see elaboration in Box 1). 5 The 'superstructure' in Marxian terms refers to social aspects such as culture, ideology and religion. The 'base' refers to the means and social relations of economic production. Economic production in this regard refers to the creation of things needed by society. Marxian logic states the economic 'base' generates the 'superstructure', a logic turned on its head in the latter half of Maoist rule. Distinguishing his approach from that of Stalin, Mao argued in the late 1960s that the Stalinist regime "speak only of the production relations, not of the superstructure nor politics, nor the role of the people." (Mao, 1977: 136) . Through the Cultural Revolution (which officially lasted between 1966 and 1976), Mao went on to prioritize ideological purity over economic production. It was arguably because of this that the Soviets subsequently charged the CPC of moving from the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism towards a new path of Maoist voluntarism. 6 While the primary -and well-documented -expressions of economic nationalism by the CPC during the Mao era was its aim to 'catch up with the UK and surpass the US' (zhuiying ganmei), a more thorough historical exploration reveals its ultimate goal could be to match, if not surpass, the Soviet Union. As Mao puts it tellingly in December 1957: "We can only copy the Soviet Union in the fundamental sense, even so I feel dissatisfied, I feel uncomfortable…The Soviets produced more than 4 million tonnes of iron in 1921, this increased to 18 million tonnes in 1940. Both the Soviet Union and China are socialist countries, could we not accelerate and expand production, could we not use a method that is bigger, faster, better and more economical to build socialism?" (in Deng, 1998: 44, 715; author's translation) . How this competitive streak to match the Soviet economic achievements contributed to the economic-geographical reconfiguration of 'new China' remains an under-explored research topic in geographical political economy. 7 The situation was exacerbated by a new initiative known as 'baoying bu baokui' that encouraged retention of profits but lack of responsibility when losses were incurred. This institution was subsequently reformed as SOEs were mandated to function more like private corporate entities. 8 "Special purpose transfers", Huang and Chen (2013: 538) explain, are "commonly used by the central government to provide incentives for local governments to undertake specific policies, programs or activities favored by the central government." From 2007 data, for instance, it could be seen that while many poor provinces like Tibet, Guangxi and Jilin have benefited from these transfers, a high amount also goes to Shanghai, one of the richest province-level areas in China. Through enhancing the development of Shanghai, coastal-interior unevenness was reproduced, if not reinforced.
